Reliable re-encryption in unreliable clouds by Qin Liu et al.
Reliable Re-encryption in Unreliable Clouds
Qin Liu†‡, Chiu C. Tan‡, Jie Wu‡, and Guojun Wang†
†School of Information Science and Engineering, Central South University, Changsha, Hunan Province, P. R. China, 410083
‡Department of Computer and Information Sciences, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA
Email:{qin.liu, cctan, jiewu}@temple.edu, csgjwang@mail.csu.edu.cn
Abstract—A key approach to secure cloud computing is for
the data owner to store encrypted data in the cloud, and issue
decryption keys to authorized users. Then, when a user is
revoked, the data owner will issue re-encryption commands to
the cloud to re-encrypt the data, to prevent the revoked user
from decrypting the data, and to generate new decryption keys to
valid users, so that they can continue to access the data. However,
since a cloud computing environment is comprised of many cloud
servers, such commands may not be received and executed by all
of the cloud servers due to unreliable network communications.
In this paper, we solve this problem by proposing a time-
based re-encryption scheme, which enables the cloud servers to
automatically re-encrypt data based on their internal clocks. Our
solution is built on top of a new encryption scheme, attribute-
based encryption, to allow fine-grain access control, and does not
require perfect clock synchronization for correctness.
Index Terms—Attribute-based encryption, cloud computing,
proxy re-encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of cloud computing is increasingly popular due to
the potential cost savings from outsourcing data to the cloud
service provider (CSP). One technique to protect the data from
a possible untrusted CSP is for the data owner to encrypt the
outsourced data [1], [2]. Flexible encryption schemes such as
attribute based encryption (ABE) [3]–[5] can be adopted to
provide fine grained access control.
ABE allows data to be encrypted using an access structure
comprised of different attributes. Instead of specific decryption
keys for specific files, users are issued attribute keys. Users
must have the necessary attributes that satisfy the access struc-
ture in order to decrypt a file. For example, a file encrypted
using the access structure {(α1 ∧α2)∨α3} means that either
a user with attributes α1 and α2, or a user with attribute α3,
can decrypt the file.
The key problem of storing encrypted data in the cloud lies
in revoking access rights from users. A user whose permission
is revoked will still retain the keys issued earlier, and thus
can still decrypt data in the cloud. A naı̈ve solution is to let
the data owner immediately re-encrypt the data, so that the
revoked users cannot decrypt the data using their old keys,
while distributing the new keys to the remaining authorized
users. This solution will lead to a performance bottleneck,
especially when there are frequent user revocations.
An alternative solution is to apply the proxy re-encryption
(PRE) technique [6], [7]. This approach takes advantage of
the abundant resources in a cloud by delegating the cloud to
re-encrypt data [8], [9]. This approach is also called command-
Fig. 1. A typical cloud environment
driven re-encryption scheme, where cloud servers execute re-
encryption while receiving commands from the data owner.
However, command-driven re-encryption schemes do not
consider the underlying system architecture of the cloud
environment. A cloud is essentially a large scale distributed
system where a data owner’s data is replicated over multiple
servers for high availability. As a distributed system, the cloud
will experience failures common to such systems, such as
server crashes and network outages. As a result, re-encryption
commands sent by the data owner may not propagate to all of
the servers in a timely fashion, thus creating security risks.
To illustrate, let us consider a cloud environment shown in
Fig. 1, where the data owner’s data is stored on cloud servers
CS1, CS2, CS3, CS4. Assume that the data owner issues to
CS4 a re-encryption command, which should be propagated to
CS1, CS2, CS3. Due to a network outage, CS2 did not receive
the command, and did not re-encrypt the data. At this time, if
revoked users query CS2, they can obtain the old ciphertext,
and can decrypt it using their old keys.
A better solution is to allow each cloud server to inde-
pendently re-encrypt data without receiving any command
from the data owner. In this paper, we propose a reliable
re-encryption scheme in unreliable clouds (R3 scheme for
short). R3 is a time-based re-encryption scheme, which allows
each cloud server to automatically re-encrypt data based on its
internal clock. The basic idea of the R3 scheme is to associate
the data with an access control and an access time. Each
user is issued keys associated with attributes and attribute
effective times. The data can be decrypted by the users using
the keys with attributes satisfying the access control, and
attribute effective times satisfying the access time. Unlike the
command-driven re-encryption scheme, the data owner and the
CSP share a secret key, with which each cloud server can re-
encrypt data by updating the data access time according to its
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own internal clock.
Even through the R3 scheme relies on time, it does not
require perfect clock synchronization among cloud servers.
Classical clock synchronization techniques [10]–[13] that en-
sure loose clock synchronized in the cloud are sufficient. The
main contributions in this paper are as follows:
1) We propose an automatic, time-based, proxy re-
encryption scheme suitable for cloud environments with
unpredictable server crashes and network outages.
2) We extend an ABE scheme by incorporating timestamps
to perform proxy re-encryption.
3) Our solution does not require perfect clock synchro-
nization among all of the cloud servers to maintain
correctness.
II. RELATED WORK
Many researchers have proposed storing encrypted data in
the cloud to defend against the CSP [1], [2]. Under this
approach, users are revoked by having a third party to re-
encrypt data such that previous keys can no longer decrypt any
data [14]–[16]. The solution by [15] for instance, lets the data
owner issue a re-encryption key to an untrusted server to re-
encrypt the data. Their solution utilizes PRE [6], which allows
the server to re-encrypt the stored ciphertext to a different
cipertext that can only be decrypted using a different key.
During the process, the server does not learn the contents of
the cipertext or the decryption keys.
ABE is a new cryptographic technique that efficiently sup-
ports fine grained access control. The combination of PRE and
ABE was first introduced by [9], and extended by [8], [17]. In
[8], a hierarchical attribute-based encryption (HABE) scheme
is proposed to achieve high performance and full delegation.
The main difference between prior work and ours is that we do
not require the underlying cloud infrastructure to be reliable
in order to ensure correctness.
Our scheme relies on time to re-encrypt data. However, in a
cloud, the internal clock of each cloud server may differ. There
have been several solutions to this problem. For instance,
[10] proposed a probabilistic synchronization scheme, which
exchanges messages to get remote servers’ accurate clocks
with high probability. Work by [11] used message delay to
estimate the maximal difference between two communicating
nodes to synchronize the clocks. Work by [13] proposed a
clock synchronization scheme for cloud environments, which
uses an authoritative time source shared by all participants in
a transaction to achieve clock synchronization between virtual
cloud policy enforcement points. By applying these techniques
to achieve loose synchronization in the cloud, and to determine
the maximal time difference between the data owner and each
cloud server, our R3 scheme can always achieve correct access
control in unreliable clouds.
III. PRELIMINARY
A. Problem Formulation
We consider a cloud computing environment consisting of a
data owner, a cloud service provider (CSP) and multiple data




SK1a1 Keys for attributes a1 for TS1
. . . . . .
SK1am Keys for attributes am for TS1
. . . . . .
SKna1 Keys for attributes a1 for TSn
. . . . . .
SKnam Keys for attributes am for TSn
users. The data owner outsources his data in the form of a
set of files F1, · · · , Fn to the CSP. Each file is encrypted by
the data owner before uploading to the CSP. Data users that
want to access a particular file must first obtain the necessary
keys from the data owner in order to decrypt the file. The data
owner can also update the contents of a file after uploading it
to the CSP. This is termed a write command.
Each file, F, is encrypted with two parameters, time slice
and attributes. We divide time into time slices, and every time
slice is of equal length. We denote a particular time slice,
TS, with a subscript, where TSi = [ti, ti+1). Fig.2 illustrates
this concept. Attributes are organized into an access structure,
A, which regulates access to a file. For example, a file with
attributes α1, α2, α3 and A = {(α1∧α2)∨α3}, requires either
both attributes α1 and α2, or just α3, to satisfy the access
structure. A file F can only be decrypted with keys that satisfy
both the access structure and time slice.
A data user, after being authenticated by the data owner,
is granted a set of keys, each of which is associated with an
attribute and an effective time that denotes the length of time
the user is authorized to possess the attributes. For example, if
Alice is authorized to possess attributes a1, . . . , am from TS1
to TSn, she will be issued keys as is shown in Table I.
The security requirements of the R3 scheme are as follows:
1) Access control correctness. This requires that a data
user with invalid keys cannot decrypt the file.
2) Data consistency. This requires that all data users who
request file F, should obtain the same content in the
same time slice.
3) Data confidentiality. The file content can only be
known to data users with valid keys. The CSP is not
considered a valid data user.
4) Efficiency. The cloud servers should not re-encrypt any
file unnecessarily. This means that a file that has not been
requested by any data user should not be re-encrypted.
B. Adversary Model
Our system considers two types of adversaries. The first
type of adversary is the CSP. The CSP adversary is considered
honest-but-curious. This means that the CSP will always




PK System public key
UA Universal attributes
PKia Attribute a’s public key at TSi
skia Attribute a’s private key at TSi
MK Master key
s Shared secret key
A Alice’s attributes
T Effective time of Alice’s attributes
A Access control
PKu User public key
SKu User identity secret key
SKiu,a User attribute secret key
with attribute a and time TSi
correctly execute a given protocol, but may try to gain some
additional information about the stored data.
The second type of adversary is malicious data users. The
data user adversary will try to learn the file content that he is
not authorized to access. This adversary is assumed to possess
invalid keys (either with incorrect attributes or time). We also
assume the data user adversary can query any server in the
cloud. Note that both an honest-but-curious CSP and malicious
data users can exist together. However, we assume that the CSP
and data users will not collude to break the system, because
the CSP is considered to be honest-but-curious.
IV. BASIC R3
In the basic R3 scheme, we consider ideal conditions, where
the data owner and all of the cloud servers in the cloud
share a synchronized clock, and there are no transmission and
queueing delays when executing read and write commands.
A. Intuition
The data owner will first generate a shared secret key to the
CSP. Then, after the data owner encrypts each file with the
appropriate attribute structure and time slice, the data owner
uploads the file in the cloud. The CSP will replicate the file
to various cloud servers. Each cloud server will have a copy
of the shared secret key.
Let us assume that a cloud server stores an encrypted file
F with A and TSi. When a user queries that cloud server, the
cloud server first uses its own clock to determine the current
time slice. Assuming that the current time slice is TSi+k,
the cloud server will automatically re-encrypt F with TSi+k
without receiving any command from the data owner. During
the process, the cloud server cannot gain the contents of the
cipertext and the new decryption keys. Only users with keys
satisfying A and TSi+k will be able to decrypt F.
B. Protocol Description
We divide the description of the basic R3 scheme into three
components: data owner initialization, data user read data and
data owner write data. We will rely on the following functions.
Table II shows the notations used in the description.
1) Setup() → (PK,MK, s) : At TS0, the data owner
publishes the system public key PK, keeps the system
Algorithm 1 Basic R3 (synchronized clock with no delays)
while Receive a write command W (F, seqnum) at TSi do
Commit the write command in order at the end of TSi
while Receive a read command R(F ) at TSi do
Re-encrypt file with TSi
master key MK secret, and sends the shared secret key
s to the cloud.
2) GenKey(PK,MK, s, PKAlice,A, T ) → (SKAlice,
{SKTAlice,A}) : When the data owner wants to grant data
user Alice attributes A with valid time period T , the
data owner generates SKAlice and {SKTAlice,A} using
the system public key, the system master key, the shared
secret key, Alice’s public key, Alice’s attributes and
eligible time.
3) Encrypt(PK, A, s, TSt, F ) → (CtA) : At TSt, the
data owner encrypts file F with access structure A, and
produces ciphertext Ct
A
using the system public key,




, SKAlice, {SKtAlice,aij}1≤j≤ni) →
F : At TSt, user U , who possesses version t attribute
secret keys on all attributes in CCi, recovers F using
the system public key, the user identity secret key, and
the user attribute secret keys.
5) REncrypt(Ct
A
, s, TSt+k) → Ct+kA : When the cloud
server wants to return a data user with the file at TSt+k,






1) Data owner initialization: The data owner runs the Setup
function to initiate the system. When the data owner wants to
upload file F to the cloud server, it first defines an access
control A for F, and then determines the current time slice
TSi. Finally, it runs the Encrypt function with A and TSi
to output the ciphertext. When the data owner wants to grant
a set of attributes in a period of time to data user Alice, it
runs the GenKey function with attributes and effective times
to generate keys for Alice.
2) Data user read data: When data user Alice wants to
access file F at TSi, she sends a read command R(F ) to the
cloud server, where F is the file name. On receiving the read
command R(F ), the cloud server runs the REncrypt function
to re-encrypt the file with TSi. On receiving the ciphertext,
Alice runs the Decrypt function using keys satisfying A and
TSi to recover F.
3) Data owner write data: When the data owner wants to
write file F at TSi, it will send a write command to the cloud
server in the form of: W (F, seqnum), where seqnum is the
order of the write command. This seqnum is necessary for
ordering when the data owner issues multiple write commands
that have to take place in one time slice. On receiving the write
command, the cloud server will commit it at the end of TSi.
Algorithm 1 shows the actions of the cloud server.
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C. Security analysis
Access control correctness. It is clear that the correctness
of access control is most vulnerable when a TS changes. Let
us consider the case where Alice has keys with effective time
up to TSi, and Bob has keys with effective time starting from
TSi+1. Assuming that the data owner updates file F to F’
such that a user querying the file at TSi should obtain F,
and a user querying the file at TSi+1 should obtain F’. The
property of access control correctness fails if Alice is able to
read F’ (attack 1), or if Bob is able to read F (attack 2).
In attack 1, Alice’s best time to launch an attack is just
before ti+1, since she only has the keys to decrypt data up
to TSi. However, the cloud server will commit the write
command at ti+1 as long as its own clock is consistent with
the data owner’s clock, so that Alice never reads F’, and thus
her attack fails.
In attack 2, Bob’s best time to launch an attack is just after
ti+1. Querying earlier than ti+1 does not help Bob since he
does not have the keys to decrypt the data. However, since the
cloud server will commit the write command at ti+1 as long
as its own clock is consistent with the data owner’s clock,
Bob will never access F, but only F’. Therefore, our scheme
provides correct access control.
Data consistency. This property requires users that query
within the same TS must receive the same data. Let us assume
that both Alice and Bob have valid keys for the appropriate
time slices, and we now want to show that so long as both
Alice and Bob query within the same time slice, they must
obtain the same data. Assuming that Alice and Bob both pick
TSi to attack our scheme, the best attack time for Alice is to
query just after ti, and for Bob is to query just before ti+1.
This attack is depicted in Fig. 3. According to the R3 scheme,
the cloud server will return data that has been committed in
ti to both Alice and Bob.
We first note that any write command that occurs after
Alice and before Bob does not affect the correctness of the
R3 scheme since this command will be committed at ti+1.
Furthermore, we have to ensure that all writes committed at ti
(what we are returning to Alice and Bob) must have already
arrived before ti. Since all parties’ clocks are consistent and
there are no delays, any write command committed at ti can
only be received by the cloud server before ti. Thus, the data
returned to Alice and Bob is consistent.
Data confidentiality. In our scheme, we only store en-
crypted data in the cloud. Since the R3 scheme preserves
the data confidentiality operations from HABE scheme, and
retain the same confidentiality properties, the cloud without
knowledge of keys cannot learn any useful information about
the stored data.
Data efficiency. The cloud server does not re-encrypt a file
until a data user requests that file. Based on the properties of
function REncrypt, when k > 1, we see that the cloud server
can combine the re-encrypt operations until receiving a file
access request.
Fig. 3. Attacks to compromise the property of data consistency
Algorithm 2 Extended R3 (asynchronized clock with delays)
while Receive a write command W (F, ti+1, seqnum) do
if Current time is earlier than ti+1 + α then
Build Window i for file F
Commit the write command in Window i at ti+1 + α
else
Reject the write command
Inform the data owner to send write command earlier
while Receive a read request R(F, TSi) do
if Current time is later than ti+1 + α then
Re-encrypt the file in Window i with TSi
else
Hold on the read command until ti+1 + α
V. EXTENDED R3
In this section, we consider the scenario where there is
no synchronized clocks. We also consider transmission and
queueing delays during the write and read commands.
A. Protocol Description
We let the data owner and the cloud server agree on a
maximal waiting time α. Thus, the cloud server will wait
until ti + α to commit the write commands that should be
committed at ti, and to respond to the read commands for
reading data at TSi. The data owner and data user will include
additional information in their write or read commands. When
the data owner wants to update the file F at TSi, he will issue
a command W (F, ti+1, seqnum), where F is the file name,
ti+1 is when the updates have to take place and seqnum is
the order of the write command. When the data user wants to
read the file F at TSi, he will use a command R(F, TSi).
Then, we need to determine the maximal time difference
between the data owner and the cloud server. We denote this
time difference as , where  is no larger than the duration of
one time slice. In other words, when the data owner is at TSi,
the cloud server’s time may be TSi−1, TSi, or TSi+1. We
let the data owner issue his write command before ti+1 when
he wants this update to be reflected in TSi+1. Algorithm 2
shows the actions of the cloud server.
B. Security Analysis
Access control correctness. Here, we need to show that Al-
gorithm 2 maintains the property of access control correctness
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using the same attack 1 and attack 2 as the security analysis
in the basic R3 scheme.
In attack 1, Alice’s best time to launch her attack is just
before ti+1, since she only has the keys to decrypt data up
to TSi. However, the cloud server will commit the write
command at ti+1 + α, so that Alice never reads F’, and thus
her attack fails.
In attack 2, Bob’s best time to launch his attack is just
after ti+1. Querying earlier than ti+1 does not help Bob since
he does not have the keys to decrypt the data. However, the
cloud server will commit the write command at ti+1 +α, and
hold the read command until committing all write commands.
Therefore, Bob never reads F, but only F’.
Data consistency. We use the same attack scenario as the
security analysis in the basic R3 scheme. The cloud server will
reject all of the write commands that should be committed at
ti+α if its time is past ti+α. Then, the cloud server will hang
up all of the read commands for TSi until committing all of
the write commands at ti + α. Therefore, data is consistent.
The analyses for both data confidentiality and data effi-
ciency are the same as the basic R3 scheme.
VI. ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
One concern with the R3 scheme design is that associating
a different ciphertext for every time slice will require users
to manage a lot of keys. The number of keys that the R3
scheme requires is related to the actual length of the time
slice. This length can be set according to different application
requirements. Thus, an application that expects to revoke users
on a monthly basis will have a longer time slice, and hence
have far fewer keys, than an application where membership
changes by the hour. Furthermore, issuing multiple keys up-
front is actually more efficient. Consider an alternative design
where each valid user was issued just one key. Now, every
time any user is revoked, the owner has to inform the CSP to
re-encrypt the previous ciphertext so as to prevent the revoked
user from decrypting it again. The owner then has to update
all of the remaining valid users with the new keys to allow
them to decrypt the new ciphertext. We argue that any scheme
that stores encrypted data in the cloud has to deal with the
issue of re-encryption and re-keying. Since the remaining users
may not be online all of the time, the re-keying process is
arguably more costly. A possible improvement is to let the
owner issue a valid user a special seed value which the user
can then use to generate keys on his own. The challenge here
is to prevent the user from generating additional keys beyond
what is authorized. This remains part of our future research.
Furthermore, we only let the data owner perform data
updates. This is inflexible for applications where users may
need to update the data as well. Our solution can be extended
to allow users to perform data updates in addition to data
owners. A ticketing scheme can be used. The data owner will
issue and sign a timestamp to authorize the user to perform a
write. The user will submit the ticket together with his updates
to the CSP, which will then apply the updates. The challenge
here is the time lag between when the data owner issues the
ticket and when the user’s request reaches the CSP. This time
lag may be unknown since the user may delay sending his
update to the cloud. An additional protocol will be required
to allow the CSP to reject update requests that are too close
to the time slice borders.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the R3 scheme, a new method for
managing access control based on the cloud server’s internal
clock. Our technique does not rely on the cloud to reliably
propagate re-encryption commands to all servers to ensure
access control correctness. We showed that our solutions
remain secure without perfect clock synchronization so long
as we can bound the time difference between the servers and
the data owner.
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